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ABSTRACT Demand is growing for more accountability regarding the technological systems that increas-
ingly occupy our world. However, the complexity of many of these systems—often systems-of-systems—
poses accountability challenges. A key reason for this is because the details and nature of the information
flows that interconnect and drive systems, which often occur across technical and organizational boundaries,
tend to be invisible or opaque. This paper argues that data provenance methods show much promise as a
technical means for increasing the transparency of these interconnected systems. Specifically, given the
concerns regarding ever-increasing levels of automated and algorithmic decision-making, and so-called
‘‘algorithmic systems’’ in general, we propose decision provenance as a concept showing much promise.
Decision provenance entails using provenance methods to provide information exposing decision pipelines:
chains of inputs to, the nature of, and the flow-on effects from the decisions and actions taken (at design
and run-time) throughout systems. This paper introduces the concept of decision provenance, and takes an
interdisciplinary (tech-legal) exploration into its potential for assisting accountability in algorithmic systems.
We argue that decision provenance can help facilitate oversight, audit, compliance, risk mitigation, and user
empowerment, and we also indicate the implementation considerations and areas for research necessary for
realizing its vision. More generally, we make the case that considerations of data flow, and systems more
broadly, are important to discussions of accountability, and complement the considerable attention already
given to algorithmic specifics.
INDEX TERMS Accountability, AI, algorithmic & automated decision-making, data management, GDPR,
governance, IoT, law, machine learning, privacy, provenance, security, systems of systems, transparency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Technology is increasingly the subject of public discussion
and regulatory attention. In line with this discourse is a
demand for more accountability for the technologies that
now affect many aspects of contemporary life. This demand
will likely grow as technology increasingly pervades society,
particularly as visions such as of smart-cities and of the
Internet of Things (IoT) come to be realised. Transparency
is important for holding those responsible for such systems
to account, as it enables identification, audit, and oversight.
Indeed, there is much current discussion in the public sphere
on the transparency of major tech platforms, such as Face-
book and Google [1].
From a technical perspective, a dominant research focus is
on ‘algorithmic accountability’ [2], where much discussion
concerns issues of fairness, transparency, and explainability
particularly regarding machine learning (ML) and the
specifics of the decision-making elements.1 Generally less
considered are the challenges associated with technology’s
broader operational contexts [3]; often comprising several
different technical components, perhaps managed by differ-
ent entities (organisations), which come together to realise
particular functionality. For example, it is already common
for data to flow from users via a mobile app to the app’s
provider, then potentially on to other third-parties (e.g. pay-
ment processors). In practice, this environment represents an
interconnected system-of-systems, of which data is a driver.
The complexity of these systems-of-systems is set to increase
as more and more advanced technologies are developed,
1For an indicative reading list, see: https://www.fatml.org/resources/
relevant-scholarship.
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deployed, interconnected, and automated, by a range of enti-
ties. The grand visions of the Internet of Things and future
smart cities are cases in point (§III).
The complexity of such interconnected environments
poses significant challenges for accountability. Importantly,
the data flows that drive these interconnected systems are
often invisible or opaque. This makes it difficult to exercise
oversight and to determine where something went wrong
and who is responsible, or in some cases, even to identify
the entities involved. At the same time, these concerns are
compounded by increasing levels of automation — including
the use of ML — where certain occurrences can result in
decisions and actions with potentially immediate and far-
reaching effects.
Technical measures can assist in making systems more
transparent, improving the accountability of the organisations
and individuals responsible for them, and assisting them in
meeting their obligations. Towards this, there appears a clear
need for provenancemethods, which concern recording infor-
mation about the nature and flow of data and the contexts in
which it is processed; however, their use for accountability
concerns in such contexts have had little consideration.
This paper introduces decision provenance, which entails
using provenance methods to provide information exposing
decision pipelines: chains of inputs to, the nature of, and
the flow-on effects from, the decisions and actions taken (at
design and run-time) throughout systems. Its purpose is to
assist accountability considerations in algorithmic systems,
particularly those complex and interconnected (§IV-B).
In this paper, we explore how this aids accountability
through assisting in regulatory oversight and technical inves-
tigation, facilitating compliance and recourse, increasing
user agency, and generally contributing to better system
design, operational (run-time) management, and risk miti-
gation. We further outline the role of decision provenance
in relation to ML as an illustrative case study, arguing that
it will complement and support the ongoing work focusing
on accountability as it regards algorithmic decision-making.
And we discuss some of the implementation considerations
and research opportunities for turning decision provenance
from concept into reality.
Our aim is to highlight and raise awareness of the potential
for information about data and its flow to help in realis-
ing more transparent, accountable, and compliant systems.
Bymaking the case for decision provenance, we seek to focus
research efforts in this space.
PAPER OVERVIEW
We begin by discussing the legal drivers of accountability
and outlining the role of technology in such contexts, before
setting out how the nature of interconnected systems — an
often overlooked area in accountability discussions — poses
challenges. We then expand on the concept of decision prove-
nance, exploring the ways it can assist various aspects of
accountability by exposing the decision pipeline. We go on to
consider how this could bring benefits in a machine learning
context at design-time, run-time, and in terms of post-hoc
investigations. Finally, we discuss research challenges and
opportunities for realising decision provenance at scale. In all,
we reiterate that data flow is highly relevant to accountability
discussions, and mechanisms such as decision provenance
are an important complement to the considerable work that
focuses on the algorithmic specifics.
II. ACCOUNTABILITY
Accountability involves apportioning responsibility for a
particular occurrence and determining from whom any
explanation for that occurrence is owed. Generally speak-
ing, the entities held accountable are natural and legal per-
sons (i.e. people and organisations), whether for their own
actions or for those of people, organisations, or machines,
which are under their control, or for which they are other-
wise answerable. Therefore in a systems context, facilitating
accountability includes making it easier to determine which
person or organisation is responsible for a particular deci-
sion/action, its effects, and from (and to) whom an explana-
tion is owed for that happening [4].
This may or may not involve exploring the inner workings
of particular technologies, as tends to be the focus of the
technical research community. While there is debate about
the degree to which exposing the details of code and algo-
rithmic models actually helps accountability [5], our focus
of discussion is on making transparent the connections and
data flows driving systems, so to show the context in which
they are operating, their effects, and to indicate the entities
involved (of which there may be a number). Also relevant are
technical mechanisms that assist system design, deployment
and operation. These relate to accountability by facilitating
compliance, oversight, and empowerment.
It’s also important to note that the person or organisation
to whom a given entity is accountable will depend on the
circumstances. In one context an entity may be accountable
to end-users, in another it may be accountable to other sys-
tems operators, and in others to regulators, courts, or other
oversight bodies. This accountability may arise as a result of
statutory obligations (in data protection or privacy legislation,
for example), through contractual relationships, or in relation
to liability. When discussing accountability, it is important to
bear such context in mind.
A. THE LEGAL IMPETUS
From a legal point of view, accountability is often tied to
notions of responsibility, liability, and transparency. Indeed,
transparency is often a regulatory requirement for identifying
responsibility or liability and thus facilitating accountability.
Transparency can also assist in meeting other legal obliga-
tions arising from contractual relationships and elsewhere.
‘Transparency’, from a legal perspective, doesn’t neces-
sarily mean full transparency over the internal workings
of a system (indeed, the limitations as to the benefits of
full transparency have been well-identified [5]). Instead,
the transparency required in law usually involves information
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about the entities involved, high-level information about what
is happening with data or about what systems are doing
(rather than necessarily the specifics of how they function),
and information about the risks of using those systems [4].
In this context, accountability may involve determining
liability for an (automated) decision/action and, where harm
arises as a result of that, what restitution is owed by who
and to whom for that harm [6]. In a complex, interconnected
system-of-systems there may also be various overlapping
contractual relationships and obligations between various
entities. Contractually, accountability may involve identify-
ing where a breach of contract has occurred and thus which
entity was responsible for that breach and therefore owes
some kind of remedy.
Legal requirements for accountability naturally extend
beyond transparency, with compliance obligations arising
through various legal frameworks. Particularly prominent are
those around data protection and privacy, which is largely the
focus of our discussion. The EU’s General Data Protection
Regulation [7] (GDPR), for example, obliges data controllers
(i.e. the entities responsible for determining the means and
purposes of processing personal data)2 and data processors3
to be able to demonstrate compliance with its various require-
ments, including the data processing principles4 if personal
data is being processed. While the GDPR applies in the EU,
similar data protection frameworks exist in many other coun-
tries (with the US currently a notable outlier, though changes
may be afoot) [8]. Further, the GDPR doesn’t only apply to
data controllers and processors located within the EU, but
also to those located outside of the EU who are processing
the personal data of individuals inside the EU.5 The GDPR
therefore has a potentially global reach.
The GDPR affords several rights to data subjects (i.e. those
whose personal data is being processed)6 which controllers
are tasked with meeting, including the right to erasure7
(the ‘right to be forgotten’) and the right to object to fur-
ther processing of personal data,8 among others. It follows
that transparency over data — for example, data inventories
that record where data came from, the subjects that it refers
to, and where it goes to — will be important for fulfilling
data controllers’ obligations in relation to these rights. It is
important to note that the GDPR requires that data controllers
proactively implement measures to support compliance, and
particularly tomeet the principles of data protection by design
and by default, including to facilitate the exercising of data
subject rights and to enable regulatory oversight.9
Further, the GDPR places restrictions on solely auto-
mated decision-making that produces legal or similarly
2GDPR, Art 4(7).
3GDPR, Art 4(8).
4GDPR, Art 5.
5GDPR, Art 3(2).
6GDPR, Art 4(1).
7GDPR, Art 17.
8GDPR, Art 21.
9GDPR, Arts 12 and 25, Recitals 59 and 78.
significant effects. This kind of automated decision-making
is prohibited unless undertaken on a limited number of legal
grounds. Where data controllers are processing personal data
which they have obtained from elsewhere as part of this
kind of decision-making, it will be important for them to
know whether the applicable grounds have been met. The
GDPR also emphasises the accountability aspects of auto-
mated decision-making (whether solely automated or not),
particularly that which produces legal or similarly significant
effects, with the so-called ‘right to an explanation’ seeking
to provide data subjects with transparency rights regarding
decisions.10
The GDPR also gives regulators the power to conduct
data protection audits, and will require data controllers to
establish binding corporate rules for auditing. And, under
the GDPR, contracts between data controllers and processors
must include provisions relating to the auditing of processors
by controllers. Auditing, which necessarily requires trans-
parency, will therefore become a key aspect of data protec-
tion regulation and compliance. Moreover, there are strong
incentives for compliance, as the GDPR non-compliance
risks serious financial penalties – regulators are empowered
to impose fines of up to the greater of e20m or 4% of
annual global turnover, while other sanctions include correc-
tive orders and prohibitions on processing, which can seri-
ously impact a firm. Other regulations may also bear impact;
an example might be the EU’s proposed ePrivacy Regula-
tion [12], which as of October 2018 looks to extend certain
data management obligations to non-personal data, includ-
ing around electronic communications data and information
relating to end-user equipment,11 which becomes particularly
relevant as the IoT proliferates.
While the GDPR is therefore a major impetus for intro-
ducing technical mechanisms to increase levels of account-
ability as it relates to systems, such mechanisms may also
assist with the compliance and enforcement of other law and
regulation. It shouldn’t be forgotten that equally important
in an interconnected systems context is being able to iden-
tify which organisation is responsible for a given system
component (as discussed above). Having knowledge of the
nature of data flow and data exchanges between systems and
organisations will be crucial for accountability, as it will be of
significant importance in determining liability should harms
arise. Likewise, having knowledge of data flows and data
exchanges would assist in fulfilling contractual obligations
and in identifying who is responsible for breaches of those
obligations and thus who owes what remedies to whom.
B. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
There is a role for technical mechanisms to aid accountability.
It is said that at a technical level, accountability is grounded
in transparency and control [4], [13]. Technology will not
itself ‘solve’ accountability issues, and as mentioned earlier,
10There is debate about the extent and utility of this ‘right’ [9]–[11].
11Proposed ePrivacy Regulation, Arts 6, 7, and 8.
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technical transparency might not itself address legal account-
ability concerns; however, technology can provide the
tooling and information to assist and facilitate account-
ability, for example, by providing ‘evidence’ indicating what
is happening, or by enabling constraints, responses, and rec-
tifications.
Such technical transparency could, for instance, provide
knowledge of the legal entities involved in a system and
their roles, which otherwise may have been invisible from
various perspectives. This has accountability implications
as explored above. Further, and as well as allowing those
responsible for systems to be held to the standards required
by law, transparency providing knowledge of the nature of
systems can help in evaluating those aspects for correctness,
bias, fairness, and whether they are operating within the
parameters that are expected or desired by their designers,
operators, or end-users (§V). Transparency thus also facili-
tates control through intervention, where appropriate, so that
where problems or potential issues have been identified
within or resulting from a system, the designer or operator
of the system can intervene (automatically or manually) to
address them, while also enabling users and overseers to set
preferences or constraints (technical or otherwise) to ensure
that the functionality accords with their requirements.
In other words, though technical measures can assist the
more formal aspects of holding one to account, they also
relate to broader notions of accountability by better allowing
those responsible to meet their obligations, and by facilitating
oversight, intervention and agency. However, a highly inter-
connected context poses particular accountability challenges
which to date have been underexplored. We consider these
next.
III. THE CHALLENGE OF INTERCONNECTEDNESS
Accountability is often discussed in relation to a single organ-
isation, or in a systems-context, as discrete systems, where
the entities involved are known or predefined; e.g. concerning
the actions undertaken by a particular organisation. However,
the increasingly interconnected nature of systems means that
in many cases they do not operate discretely and in isolation
but are employed as part of a system-of-systems [14], [15],
with potentially many entities involved [16], [17].
One system, for example, may take inputs from a range of
sensors and may then produce an automated decision in the
form of a data output that itself forms the input to another
system, which, in turn, may produce an output through a
device that creates a physical interaction with a real-world
object or a person; emerging autonomous transport systems
will likely entail lots of such functionality [18]. In other
words, the individual component systems interact and com-
bine to bring functionality through a system-of-systems,
where components may be potentially managed by multiple
different entities.
The general direction towards more connectivity can be
seen, for example, in relation to smart cities [19]–[21].
As Fig. 1 shows, there are already a number of smart systems
FIGURE 1. Some smart city technologies implemented in Dublin as
of 2016 [20]. The broader visions for smart cities is for systems like these,
as well as new systems, to interact with each other as well as with
various commercial and consumer-oriented services.
which are being deployed to manage cities. And, as the vision
of the smart city is increasingly realised, increasing numbers
of complex systems will be deployed and will interact with
each other. At a more granular level, we already see systems
which are composed of interconnected systems – the popu-
larity of cloud ([something]-as-a-service) a case in point.
Importantly, in these interconnected systems data flow
drives everything, in that the flow of data between, through,
and across systems works to integrate them and brings their
functionality [22]. A given data flow might encapsulate, for
example, a sensor reading, the contents of a web form, the
inputs to or outputs (decision or actions) from a machine
learned model, a batch transfer of a dataset, an actuation
command, a database query or result, and more. However,
in most cases the visibility over the nature and flow of
data is lost once it moves beyond a particular boundary,
whether that is technical (e.g. between software components
and services) or administrative (e.g. between organisations or
jurisdictions).
Likewise, the lack of visibility over data flows in intercon-
nected systems poses various challenges from a legal point
of view. Not only will it be important to identify where data
has been obtained from, but in order to meet data protection
obligations it will be important for data controllers to know
under what circumstances and on what conditions personal
data was obtained. Similarly, if data controllers share data
with others, it will be important for each entity to have a
record of when the data was shared, from and to whom the
data was shared, the basis on which the data was shared, and
any conditions attached to the use of that data. This is all in
addition to information regarding how the data is managed
and processed.
For example, the GDPR requires that personal data be
collected for specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes and
only be processed in a manner compatible with those pur-
poses (a principle known as ‘purpose limitation’).12 Knowl-
edge of where data has been obtained from and under what
12GDPR Art 5(1)(b).
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FIGURE 2. An example illustrating an interconnected system-of-systems. Here, sensor data drives the inferences of a predictive model which are
recorded in a datastore. This is then queried by a process which feeds the result, alongside another input, into another model that affects an action.
One can imagine similar arrangements involving, for instance, a smart home management system, which automatically controls the environment, being
influenced by systems that forecast weather, wearables inferring a resident’s mood and well-being, and so forth, where each component might be
managed by a different entity.
circumstances it was obtainedwill also likely be important for
complying with restrictions in other regulations, such as the
proposed ePrivacy legislation on the use of various kinds of
non-personal data, as well as for establishing liability where
harms are caused.13
However, meeting these kinds of obligations may be diffi-
cult, and in some cases impossible, without some knowledge
of the provenance of incoming and the path of outgoing data
flows. To return to the data protection example, where data
controllers have obtained personal data from a third party
but lack knowledge of the conditions on which that data was
obtained by that third party, such as that the data is not to be
used for the purposes of advertising, complying with the kind
of restrictions imposed by the principle of purpose limitation
would be particularly difficult.
The general opacity of the interconnections between sys-
tems, coupled with the general lack of technical means for
tracking data flow at such a scale, therefore poses account-
ability issues, as it becomes difficult to discern the techni-
cal components involved, and then who is responsible for
these [22], [23]. Moreover, decisions and actions somewhere
within an assemblage might propagate widely, making it
difficult to trace the source (organisational or technical) when
concerns arise, and all the consequential (flow-on) effects.
As an example, a reading from a faulty sensor could lead
to cascading knock-on effects causing significant disruption,
though its relationship to thismay not be readily evident given
the gaps in ‘time and space’.
IV. DECISION PROVENANCE: EXPOSING THE
DECISION PIPELINE
From the above, we can see that greater visibility over the
interrconnections and assemblages of systems is important
for increasing accountability for them. Given that data drives
systems, there appears to be real potential in applying data
provenance methods as a means of working towards this.
Put simply, data provenance concerns capturing informa-
tion describing data: recording the data’s lineage, including
where it came from, where it moves to, and the associated
dependencies, contexts (environmental and computational),
13Though, as mentioned, ePrivacy Regulation is still but a proposal, it is
indicative of the sorts of concerns we can expect to see in going forward.
and processing steps [24].14 It is commonly used within
research to assist reproducibility by providing records of data,
workflows and computation [25], [26].
Provenance is an active area of research [25], and is com-
monly applied in a research context to assist in reproducibil-
ity by recording the data, workflows and computation of
scientific processes [25], [26]. The potential for provenance
to assist compliance with specific information management
obligations has previously been considered (often focusing
on a particular technical aspect, be it representation or cap-
ture) [22], [23], [27]–[29]. However, the use of data prove-
nance methods generally for systems-related accountability
concerns, as detailed above, has yet to be considered in depth.
As such, here we first motivate the potential for provenance to
assist algorithmic accountability, and later highlight research
opportunities for moving forward.
A. DECISION PROVENANCE
Given (i) the concerns around accountability for automated
and algorithmic decision-making systems, (ii) the increas-
ingly interconnected nature of system deployments, and
(iii) the potential of provenance methods in this space, we
propose decision provenance as a way forward.15
Decision provenance concerns the use and means for
provenance mechanisms to assist accountability considera-
tions in algorithmic systems. Specifically, decision prove-
nance involves providing the information on the nature and
contexts of the data flows and interconnections leading up
to a decision or action, the flow-on effects, and also how
such information can be leveraged for better system design,
inspection, validation and operational (run-time) behaviour.
In this way, decision provenance helps expose the decision
pipelines in order to make visible the nature of the inputs
to and cascading consequences of any decision or action
(at design/ or run-time), alongside the entities involved,
systems-wide (e.g. see Fig. 2). The broad aim is to help
increase levels of accountability, both by providing the
information and evidence for investigation, questioning, and
recourse, and by providing information which can be used
to proactively take steps towards reducing and mitigating
14A detailed overview and elaboration of the nuances of data provenance
can be seen in [24] and [25].
15Distinct from the DECProv ontology for the general modelling of the
specifics of a decision-making process: https://promsns.org/def/decprov.
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risks and concerns, and facilitating legal compliance and user
empowerment.
B. PROVENANCE: FACILITATING ACCOUNTABILITY
As we have outlined, the opacity of the interconnections in
complex systems poses significant accountability challenges.
Decision provenance concerns capturing records of data flow
throughout a system, as relevant for accountability consid-
erations; which can include the nature of who (legal entity)
the data comes from or goes to, how the data was processed,
used, and other appropriate contextual information, such as
data protection aspects, system configuration, actions of staff,
etc. This works to expose the decision pipeline by providing
records regarding:
(i) the history for particular data, and
(ii) the broader view of system behaviour and interactions
and the interactions between entities.
Such records are not only useful for (ex-post) audit and inves-
tigation, but can also actively drive or determine interventions
and actions.16
As a result, decision provenance can help improve account-
ability by assisting oversight, empowerment, investigation,
audit, and compliance. There are potential benefits for system
designers, operators, auditors, regulators, and others from
both a technical and a legal point of view, as well as for end-
users. Generally speaking, more information regarding the
nature of systems could allow those building and deploying
systems to improve their quality and to identify points of fail-
ure, while empowering others by offering more insight into
the nature of the systems and data that is beyond their direct
control [4], [22], [23]. Proactive accountability measures can
be employed, where the knowledge regarding nature of the
data flowing into, within, and beyond a system drives or deter-
mines particular actions or behaviour, e.g. influencing if and
how data is processed. Responses may be human or organisa-
tional, perhaps automated through a triggered or event-based
response [22].
The general idea is conceptually similar to the tracking of
physical items through product supply chains, which helps
manufacturers gain a better understanding of the provenance
of their products and of the materials therein [31]. This
allows factories and warehouses to respond and be account-
able to manufacturers, which in turn allows manufacturers
to be accountable to regulators and consumers. Naturally,
provenance will not solve all accountability challenges, but
it assists by providing visibility in complex environments by
exposing the relations and dependencies where such visibility
may not otherwise exist.
ACCOUNTABILITY BENEFITS
Wenow explore someways inwhich decision provenance can
assist specific accountability considerations of algorithmic
systems, before the next section that explores ML-driven
16In a similar vein to how run-time provenance has been used for detecting
and notifying of system faults [30].
systems as a case study. It is worth noting that while we
have delineated these benefits, they can be interrelated – legal
investigation, for example, may involve technical audit and
investigation.
1) UNDERSTANDING SYSTEM BEHAVIOUR
Generally, knowledge of the nature of the data flowing in,
out and within a system, in terms of where it has come
from, where it goes, how it has and is being used, as well as
the relevant environmental and computational contexts, can
help systems designers and operators (manually or through
automatic means) monitor, maintain and improve the quality
of their systems on an ongoing basis. The potential for prove-
nance methods to allow one to ‘see’ across systems and their
interconnections can also enable proactive steps to be taken
in order to address problems before they arise. This works
towards increasing the overall quality, security, and reliability
of complex, interconnected systems and services, which has
clear organisational benefits.
2) COMPLIANCE AND OBLIGATION MANAGEMENT
Decision provenance can assist those responsible for systems
in complying with their legal (and other) obligations [28].
As discussed in §II, servicing many of the rights afforded
to individuals in data protection law could be facilitated
through mechanisms for tracing the paths of data so as to
identify where data resides, with whom it was shared, and
how it was processed (e.g. see [23], [28]). Decision prove-
nance could work to create data inventories, which can be
of use in meeting obligations such as the right to erasure,
subject access requests, and others in data protection law.
It would make it easier to meet obligations to provide infor-
mation to data subjects, including on what personal data is
being processed, where it has been obtained from, and which
other data controllers or processors will or have received the
data.
Decision provenance could also allow for the tracking of
conditions associated with the processing of personal data,
such as those relating to consent for processing data, the pur-
poses for which data may be processed, and the sharing of
data with other entities. This would assist data controllers
in complying with the various data protection principles.
This may also be of use in assisting compliance with future
regulations, e.g. the proposed ePrivacy Regulation, which
establishes some similar requirements on the use of some
non-personal data.
Decision provenance can similarly assist in managing a
broader range of legal, regulatory, and other obligations
(‘soft law’, best practices, etc). For instance, where con-
tractual obligations exist between entities, knowledge of the
nature of data flow between parties could make it possible to
ensure and validate that data is processed in a way compatible
with the contract governing that data flow or processing
relationship. And information of the sources and lineage of
data used for analytics and ML (see §V) might assist with
issues of unfairness and discrimination [32].
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Reactive, event-based mechanisms could also
automatically take actions to assist compliance and obliga-
tion management [22]. For instance, provenance information
could be used to trigger particular compliance operations;
such as to automatically report data breaches to the relevant
authorities; to screen and filter out data based on compliance
criteria (e.g. data past an expiry date or use); to not act
on inputs that may have come from, or through, an unre-
liable entity [28]; or to automatically prevent data flows
that are unexpected (in terms of a pre-defined management
policy [22]).
3) OVERSIGHT AND REGULATORY AUDIT
The use of decision provenance techniques has much poten-
tial to aid the auditing and oversight activities of regula-
tors, as provenance involves generating detailed information
for assisting oversight that was previously unavailable. This
might include, for instance, data protection regulators using
provenance data to assess that the data flows pertaining to
an organisation (data controller) are appropriate, or more
generally that the organisation has the appropriate data man-
agement (and other) practices in place, and has taken the
appropriate actions regarding specific incidents.
Beyond regulators and oversight bodies, the same methods
are useful for organisations to help in managing their own
data ‘supply chains’. For example, such information assists
an organisation in evaluating that other business they engage
with (e.g. through a data processor relationship) are meeting
their contractual and data management obligations by han-
dling data appropriately.
4) TECHNICAL AUDIT AND INVESTIGATION
Decision provenance can also help facilitate technical audit
and investigations in complex systems by helping systems
designers and operators to identify points of failure or issues
requiring further investigation. This includes both post-
hoc investigation as well as run-time reaction (e.g. alert-
ing of unexpected system behaviour). Exposing the decision
pipeline can help in identifying aspects such as the steps
behind the leakage of personal or otherwise sensitive data,
and in tracking the cascading consequences of a particular
(perhaps erroneous) event. This could, for example, make it
easier to determine whether it was a particular data source
such as a sensor producing invalid readings, poor data selec-
tion by a system designer, or a learned model being inappro-
priately applied, that eventually led to decisions with poor
outcomes being made.
The importance of such concerns will only increase as
the visions of the IoT and smart cities become a reality,
due to their complex and highly-interconnected nature and
also their potential for emergent functionality and real-time
reconfiguration [4], [22].
5) LIABILITY AND LEGAL INVESTIGATION
Where harm is caused by a failure, particularly in complex
systems environments, decision provenance can help identify
which system caused that harm, thereby helping to identify
the organisation responsible and potentially liable for that
harm and assisting in holding them to account. Provenance
data may also work to absolve systems designers and opera-
tors from responsibility by providing evidence demonstrating
that the right decisions were made and actions were taken.
In this way, decision provenance is useful for organisations/
operators, to help manage their liability concerns, as well as
for regulators and law enforcement.
More generally, decision provenance can assist in ascer-
taining whether legal obligations were met. For instance,
where contractual obligations exist between entities, if there
is a breach of contract, knowledge of data flow assists sys-
tems operators in identifying where that breach occurred
and therefore who is responsible and what remedy is
owed.
In this way, decision provenance can offer preemptive
advantages, by allowing organisations to have greater con-
trol over how their data (that for which they have respon-
sibilities) and services are subsequently used. For example,
organisations could contractually require visibility over how
certain services and data are used by external parties, where
decision provenance records provide such information. This
could limit instances of data misuse by giving organisations
a technical means to monitor how their data is used, possibly
in real-time, and enable action where such uses are deemed
unacceptable. Indeed, enhanced means for governance
could encourage collaboration, and help in tackling data
silos.
Similar methods could be used to investigate suspected
or actual breaches of other legal/regulatory obligations.
6) END-USER AGENCY AND EMPOWERMENT
There are also potential benefits for individuals in terms of
increased agency. Decision provenance information could
help users make better-informed decisions about the services
that they use. If a user could see in advance that giving
data to a particular system could, for example, (a) result in
certain decisions being made that have particular undesired
consequences; or (b) flow to an undesired entity (such as a
certain advertisement network), then this helps that user to
make a more informed choice about whether to use (allow
their data to flow into) that system.
Of course, evidence of prior behaviour does not necessarily
imply future behaviour will remain the same; however it can
be indicative. That said, proactive measures could also be
employed to allow users to set policy that constrain partic-
ular information flows [22], or keep users informed of any
change in circumstance. For instance, mechanisms could be
built whereby the detection of unexpected flows could trigger
an alert indicating a change in policy or system operation
(or a potential data leakage), e.g. a social media firm suddenly
engaging a new advertising network. Such measures, driven
by provenance information, could allow users to take action,
e.g. exercise their rights, complain to a regulator, stop using
the service.
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These aspects are important given the ever-increasing
prominence of data-gathering systems, and in addition to
generally increasing levels of agency, might facilitate a more
informed and effective exercise of data subject (and other)
rights. Measures that help users make better-informed deci-
sions about which systems they engage with may also work
to incentivise those producing and operating technology to
improve their practices at all steps, and to help better align
their offerings with user expectations and preferences.
V. CASE STUDY: MACHINE LEARNING PIPELINES
A key driver for discussions of algorithmic accountabil-
ity, automated decision-making, and indeed, decision prove-
nance, is the increasing prevalence of machine learning (ML).
The popularity of ML, which drives algorithmic decision-
making, has been a core instigator of discussions regarding
‘FAT’ (fairness, accountability, transparency).17 We see deci-
sion provenance as a key component within the wider context
of fair, accountable, and transparent technologies, and discuss
ML as an example use-case to illustrate how it could help
advance such aims.
ML is driven by data. It works to uncover patterns in data so
as to build and refine representative mathematical models of
that data which can be used to make predictions, decisions,
and gain knowledge and insight [33]. These models can be
used for problems that would otherwise be challenging to
program specific rules for, such as object classification in
images, by instead having the model derive these through
trends in the training data. In a systems context, these models
are applied to new (‘live’) input data, with the corresponding
output(s) (also data) representing a prediction, a decision,
an action, an inference, and so on.
ML raises interesting considerations in a systems context.
First, ML is part of the ‘big data’ trend, where vast quantities
of data which can originate from a wide variety of sources
is relevant for both the building and use of ML models. Yet,
the data itself can often be the problem; biased data will often
result in biased models [34]–[37]. This is particularly prob-
lematic when consequences and implications are significant,
such as with criminal justice risk scores and credit offers [36],
and the increasing popularity of ML risks those who are not
domain experts unintentionally misusing datasets which are
unsuitable in particular contexts [38].
Further, we increasingly see ML models being offered as a
service,18 allowing users to pass input data to these services
and receive their predicted outputs. In practice this means that
ML models can be integrated together with other software
processes, and indeed other models to form complex, inter-
connected chains of systems (see Fig. 2).
Given the ever-increasing complexity of algorithmic sys-
tems, and as systems ascend beyond the scope of single
17See, for example, http://www.fatml.org.
18See, for example, services currently offered by Google: https://cloud.
google.com/products/machine-learning, Microsoft: https://azure.microsoft.
com/en-gb/services/cognitive-services, and Amazon: https://aws.amazon.
com/machine-learning.
FIGURE 3. Training data comprised from multiple sources.
organisations and legal jurisdictions, information of the
source, lineage and nature of data, models, and decisions/
actions taken will also be important even when considering
accountability and transparency in relation to the decision-
making elements (ML, analytics). As is the case with inter-
connected systems in general, data flow is the enabler of ML.
This includes, for example, the data flows relating to the
training of models (design-time), the use of models that make
decisions (run-time), and the flow-on effects of those deci-
sions throughout the system. As such, we argue that mech-
anisms for decision provenance, that operate throughout,
is becoming ever more important for assisting accountability
in these systems arrangements.
A. ASSISTING TRAINING AND DESIGN
Machine learning models are built (trained) on data, and
therefore reflect the nature of that data. Training models on
data of a poor quality (e.g. unrepresentative, biased, erro-
neous, etc.) can lead to issues being encoded within these
models and reflected in themodel’s application. Indeed, mod-
els can encode issues of bias, discrimination, and unfairness
that are inherent in that data [34]–[37]. In an interconnected
context, a training dataset may comprise data from a range
of sources, including sensors, human input, system logs,
data brokers, and so on, and can also include outputs from
calculations, analytics, or indeed, other ML models (§III).
Provenance has a clear role to play in showing the nature
of the training datasets, in that revealing the pipeline can
allow for greater knowledge of the sources of data, assisting
in assessing their veracity. Such oversight could highlight the
potential for errors, inherent bias, or unfairness present in any
models which use this data, enabling ML practitioners to be
better informed and take redeeming actions. An example of
this in practice is the careful use of sampling techniques and
respondent weighting in opinion polling.19 This use is also
in line with common applications of provenance for research
reproducibility.
It is increasingly recognised the importance for the
ML practitioners, themselves, to record information relating
to the datasets, such as their motivation for creation, com-
position, process of collection, preprocessing, distribution,
maintenance, and legal and ethical considerations [38]. Such
records can be used to evaluate whether certain data should
be permitted for use in the construction of a MLmodel, based
19And indeed, such provenance records also facilitate the use of post-hoc
analysis on such polls (e.g. [39]), akin to what we discuss in §V-C.
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on the metadata of that dataset. While current steps entail
manual (human) processes to record such information, typ-
ically within the scope of a single organisation [38], decision
provenance involves technical means for collecting informa-
tion relating to data and models, potentially including the
computational contexts in which models were constructed,
right throughout a data supply chain. In this way, decision
provenance can provide much information, perhaps comple-
menting other records, for data and model assessment.
B. ASSISTING OPERATION
Machine learning models are often applied to ‘live’ data,
which is given as an input to a trained model in order to
produce one or more outputs. These outputs may result in
physical-world actions (i.e. an actuation command) or outputs
that feed into other datasets or trigger other models, possibly
crossing administrative boundaries and affecting a range of
entities (see Fig. 2). By capturing the provenance and nature
of the model inputs and the decision itself (i.e. the model out-
puts), decision provenance could be used to detect conflicts
and uphold compliance at run-time.
As an example, provenance information could inform
model selection: where the lineage of data determines (at run-
time) the appropriate model on which the data is applied.
For example, if data being passed into a live model comes
from a recognisably different source (sampling distribution)
than the data that was used to train the model, actions could
be taken to prevent such processing. Further, rules could,
for example, prevent a data subject’s personal data being
presented to a ML model — at run-time — unless they have
chosen to allow solely automated decision making20 (which
itself could potentially also form part of the provenance, e.g.
recorded against the data, or evident based on the chain of
components surrounding that data). The above represents but
a few examples of how decision provenance would facilitate
a number of applications and advantages that assist with
algorithmic accountability/decision-making.
C. USING THE DECISION PIPELINE: POINTS FOR
INVESTIGATION
As §IV describes, decision provenance helps investigate com-
plex and interconnected systems by exposing the data flow
and interconnections leading up to a decision or action, and
the entities involved. Once the decision pipeline has been
used to identify the particular source(s) (technical compo-
nents and/ or legal entities) potentially related to an issue,
auditors can then narrow their focus and go into detail. For
instance, if the issue concerns a decision originating from a
specific ML model in the chain of systems, this may involve
going on to inspect the workflows and processes around
the construction of that model [3], e.g. which might entail
looking at the ‘dataset’s datasheets’ [38], or by using tech-
niques discussed in the algorithmic accountability literature
(e.g. [2]). Information about the workflow of model construc-
20GDPR, Art 22.
tion and deployment itself facilitates auditing of, for example,
the learning algorithm (or algorithms in ensemble models)
used, hyperparameters, predictor variables, and coefficients
(variable weights) [40].
As such, decision provenance complements the
ML-oriented work on ‘algorithmic accountability’ (i.e. that
focused on the decision-making elements), by providing
auditors with information of the wider, practical context in
which automated decision making processes were defined,
built and operate, as a means for indicating where deeper
(model-centric or other) investigations can then take place.
VI. MOVING FORWARD: IMPLEMENTATION
CONSIDERATIONS AND RESEARCH
OPPORTUNITIES
Despite the potential for decision provenance, work is needed
to make it a reality.21 Though, as mentioned, provenance
has been considered for some specific compliance aspects
(see for e.g. [22], [23], [27]–[29]), the broader accountability
considerations have yet to be explored in depth. In terms of
decision provenance operating between systems and across
boundaries, many of the open challenges predominately stem
from the scale, federation, and complexity of what are effec-
tively wide-scale distributed systems that can encompass a
range of technologies, and also a number of organisations
with different and possibly competing incentives. For prove-
nance to enable accountability, crucial is the consistency,
visibility, and veracity of provenance information across this
federated environment.
Towards this, we now indicate some areas for considera-
tion, focusing on the methods for gathering and representing
provenance information, as that provides the foundation for
the accountability opportunities previously discussed (§IV).
A. MEANS FOR APPROPRIATE CAPTURE AND RECORD
MANAGEMENT
A key consideration are the mechanisms for capture, i.e. the
technical means for producing provenance information.
One categorisation of provenance mechanisms entails two
categories [24]: disclosed and observed provenance. Dis-
closed provenance tends to be application-oriented, where the
details of what to record, and when, are written into appli-
cation(s) code (often in APIs, as points of data exchange).
This allows customisation by the designers as to what is
deemed important, but will only capture what is explicitly
programmed for, and depending on the implementation, may
facilitate users (or others) providing extra ‘manual’ prove-
nance information relevant to provenance records.
Observed provenance captures information by observ-
ing what occurs; for example, by embedding the capture
21That said, there are real and immediate benefits in employing methods
for capturing provenance information now, in more local scenarios and as
much as is possible with current tooling (technical or otherwise), as even
internal organisational usage can help in managing systems, processes, and
obligations, while assisting compliance and providing evidence demonstrat-
ing good practice [28].
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mechanism into the platform/infrastructure (e.g. an oper-
ating system (OS)), to capture the data flows regarding
the applications running within that environment [41]–[43].
By the capture mechanism operating externally from appli-
cations, this allows the interactions between various appli-
cations (system components) to be recorded irrespective of
the application specification and design – without the need
for developer (let alone user) intervention or even knowl-
edge. Further, potentially capturing every data flow in the
operating environment reduces the propensity for ‘missing
something’. However, a general observed capture mechanism
is comparatively less-targeted, and raises serious overhead
considerations given the propensity for the volume of the
recorded information to be extremely large and complex [44].
In practice, it is likely that decision provenance may
require a combination of capture mechanisms to ensure that
the appropriate information is recorded [45], [46],22 as, for
instance, some aspects might be observable (e.g. data flowing
between software components in a cloud service), and others
rather unobservable from purely a technical perspective and
therefore requiring more manual intervention (e.g. capturing
the intentions or thoughts of employee users).
An interconnected system-of-systems — with its many
moving parts — poses practical implementation challenges,
given the requirement for the provenance regime to operate
consistently throughout, as we now explore.
CAPTURE MECHANISMS
Capture mechanisms should be able to function throughout
the entire decision pipeline, by operating at the appropriate
points within and across technical and organisational bound-
aries. Capture regimes that are bound to a specific appli-
cation might suffice where the pipelines/supply chains are
pre-known, well-defined and fairly static; though of course,
such approaches are limited to only those pre-defined appli-
cations and organisations. In contrast, observed approaches
suit capturing detailed information across applications, but
only within the scope of specific operating environments
(e.g. a platform/OS instance). There is on-going work
towards the challenges in maintaining consistent capture
regime across boundaries, administrative/organisational and
operational, e.g. as data flows from one OS (machine) to
another [22], [23], [29], [41], [43].
In practice, it is likely that exposing the decision pipeline
will require several complementary capture regimes. This
accords with the conceptual provenance stack, which defines
a series of layers for focusing specific provenance considera-
tions — corresponding to different levels of abstraction — to
enable a more complete regime [25], [45], [46]. Work will be
needed to ensure interoperability and/ or to enable the recon-
ciliation of records across different capture mechanisms.
In line with this, an important area of work is in defining
the standards, guarantees and best practices regarding capture
22Though this could be limited where provenance concerns are narrow
and focused.
mechanisms. These will be important for increasing levels
of completeness in provenance records, including the recon-
ciliation and interoperability just mentioned, and more gen-
erally, to enable provenance at scale. They will also assist in
(i) enabling ex post accountability, i.e. enabling investigation,
as well as providing (ii) a foundation for enabling proac-
tive (ex ante) responses (§IV-B), including technical policy
enforcement regimes that can react to certain events based on
the provenance information [22].
DATA MANAGEMENT
Related is how the captured provenance data is recorded
and made accessible across boundaries (technical or organ-
isational). The storage requirements and possible sensitivity
of provenance data tends towards such information being
federated across organisations. If provenance information is
federated, questions arise as to how it can be reconciled across
systems and organisational boundaries (i.e. in addition to
across the technical boundaries mentioned above) in order to
make the decision pipeline visible, and how this provenance
data is to be aggregated (if at all), queried, and so on.
Another consideration are the record-keeping require-
ments: for how long should provenance data be kept? Data
retention considerations are particularly important if serving
as ‘evidence’ supporting investigations or other accountabil-
ity processes. There is scope for methods that aggregate,
summarise and compress such information to assist storage/
management overheads.
Further, the security of, and access to the provenance data
itself raises accountability questions, given that, as informa-
tion about data, systems and processing, it may itself be sensi-
tive [23], or comewith various legal obligations – particularly
in a cross-organisational context.23 Secure management of
this data is one area of consideration [47], including deter-
mining the contexts in which provenance information can be
shared, and access controls might be restricted or opened to
others, such as regulators, in certain circumstances. In such
scenarios, distributed queries that operate across provenance
repositories may offer promise.
The above concerns are context-specific, depending on the
nature of the record and what it holds; e.g. some records
may be more useful or sensitive than others. In practice,
it may be that data management and reconciliation decisions
are driven by standards, best practices, on the guidance of
overseers, or determined by legal, regulatory or contractual
obligations, presenting potential ways forward.
TRUST
For provenance information to be useful, it must be reli-
able. However, this is a particular challenge here for several
inter-related reasons. First, the risks and incentives in an
accountability context are complex, given that the provenance
information relates to responsibilities from which onerous
23Note that the nature of provenance information may well serve to place
additional legal, management and risk-related obligations on organisations.
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consequences might result.24 Second is the inherent feder-
ation in terms of the mechanisms for capture and what is
recorded. Third, the nature of the means for capture that are
used, e.g. disclosed or observed and the level of the technical
abstraction in which they operate, impacts issues of reliabil-
ity, validity, accuracy, usefulness and completeness. These
aspects in combination raise issues of trust in multi-party
scenarios, where data flows across administrative or organ-
isational (i.e. responsibility) domains.
In all, there is a clear requirement for means that assure
and ensure the integrity of the capture regime, recorded data,
the query mechanism, and any other compliance mechanisms
(such as policy enforcement regimes) that leverage prove-
nance data, and also to ensure that this integrity is main-
tained throughout any pipeline [22], [23], [48]. Towards this,
standardisation, verification, attestation, and secure logging
mechanisms will all be relevant.
B. MAKING PROVENANCE DATA MEANINGFUL
Regardless of the capture and storage mechanisms, prove-
nance records should be consistent and meaningful in order
to be useful in assisting accountability concerns.
REPRESENTATION OF PROVENANCE DATA
In a systems context, it is important that there is a com-
mon representation of provenance data so that it can be
widely understood and interoperate system-wide. Standards
will help support the interpretability and understanding of
audit records within and across systems. The W3C PROV25
standard provides an extensible26 mechanism for modelling
provenance data, while ontologies (description vocabularies)
provide the means for describing what has been captured.
W3C PROV is capable of capturing aspects relevant for
compliance and accountability, for example, for recording
which parties undertook various activities with regard to
data, or modelling GDPR compliance [49].
In moving forward, one consideration is whether spe-
cialisedmodels or vocabularies will be necessary for account-
ability purposes (be they general or specific), as well as to
help align the provenance information that is captured at
different technical layers of abstraction (§VI-A). Different
extensions may also be needed to cater for the specifics of a
particular application domain; what needs to be captured for
an automated traffic management system will differ to that of
an e-commerce website.
USABILITY OF CAPTURED DATA
Awider consideration is how stakeholders from diverse back-
grounds and with varying goals can interpret and use prove-
nance data; though this is a general challenge for provenance
given that captured data is often, or can quickly become,
24There are, however, incentives to implement such provenance mecha-
nisms, for instance, to produce evidence that aid arguments for absolving
responsibility (‘‘I’ve done nothing wrong’’).
25https://www.w3.org/TR/prov-overview/.
26For instance, see the PROVOne extensions for scientific workflows:
https://purl.dataone.org/provone-v1-dev.
extremely complex [26], [50]–[52]. Such concerns are exac-
erbated in a large-scale systems context, and are problematic
where accountability is the aim. Some (e.g. end-users) may be
interested simply in the entities involved, while others (e.g.
regulators) may require more information. This means that
the provenance data captured may be difficult to interpret
for some — for instance, making sense of data representing
different levels of the technical stack/abstraction may be
beyond the expertise of non-technical users — and, further,
those seeking to interact with such data may not be familiar
with the nature of the systems involved.
Again, standards will be important. Given that provenance
information may be relevant for different audiences, there
may be a need for various tools and extensions to assist.
Some may describe lower-level technical details for a highly
specialist audience, whereas others may, e.g., simply list the
entities involved in order to assist a non-expert.
There is a clear opportunity for human computer inter-
action (HCI) research to assist in ensuring that decision
provenance approaches enable a representation that assists
end-users regarding their accountability concerns. A num-
ber of techniques have been suggested as ways in which
provenance data can be made more usable and understand-
able, including Natural Language Interfaces for Databases
(NLIDBs) [53], data visualisation techniques (such as graphs
and plots) [50], [51], [53], as well as using online games [54]
and comics [55] as a means for describing captured prove-
nance information to end users. Generally, more work is
required to explore the presentation of such data for account-
ability purposes, in ways that support the various perspectives
(including users, technical experts, regulators, auditors, etc.)
relevant in an accountability context.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are strong pressures for improving the levels of
accountability for technology – driven by societal demands,
increasingly stringent legal requirements, and for reasons of
public acceptance and adoption. In line with this, there is
much discussion of algorithmic accountability, with a par-
ticular focus on automated decision-making (including ML).
However, less-considered are the accountability challenges
relating to the broader systems context – particularly as sys-
tems are increasingly interconnected. Since these data-driven
assemblages tend to be opaque, there is a pressing need to
expose the nature and flow of data leading to, and resulting
from, a decision or action to help raise levels accountability
in interconnected environments.
We therefore propose decision provenance as an important
piece of this accountability ‘jigsaw’, offering much potential
for assisting with issues of responsibility, technical compli-
ance, and improved user agency in systems. Decision prove-
nance won’t itself solve all the complexities of increasingly
interconnected systems, rather it provides visibility over the
relations and dependencies of such systems where such visi-
bility may not otherwise exist. As we have outlined, this has
direct benefits from an accountability perspective.
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In all, our wider goal is to highlight and raise aware-
ness that exposing information of the contexts and nature of
data flow, and the broader decision pipeline, is important,
relevant and complements other accountability work that
focuses on the decision-making elements (e.g. ML models).
Indeed, means for increasing accountability in a systems-of-
systems context will only increase in importance as visions
of pervasive computing: smart cities, the Internet of Things,
autonomous transport systems, etc., become a reality. By
presenting the concept of decision provenance, we seek to
both focus and drive research efforts in the area, to realise the
opportunities for provenance to assist systems accountability
concerns.
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